Coherence for Development: Economic Recommendations for Spain by Olivié Aldasoro, LLiana & Sorroza Blanco, Alicia
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coherence for Development: Economic 
Recommendations for Spain 
 
Iliana Olivié and Alicia Sorroza 
 
Working Paper (WP) 14/2006 
 
3/8/2006 
Area: International Cooperation & Development – WP 14/2006 
August 2006 
 
 
Coherence for Development: Economic 
Recommendations for Spain1
 
Iliana Olivié and Alicia Sorroza 
 
 
 
Summary: This paper looks at the coherence of development policies with regard to the 
consistency between, on the one hand, the objectives or results of a donor’s economic 
policies that have an impact on the countries receiving development aid, and, on the 
other, the objectives of the official international development cooperation policy. 
 
 
CONTENTS 
 
List of Acronyms 2 
 
1. Analysis: Impact of Donor’s Policies on the Development of Aid-Receiving Countries 4 
 
1.1. Trade Policy 4 
1.2. Emigrant Remittances 7 
1.3. Foreign Direct Investment and Development 10 
1.4. External Debt, Restructuring and Cancellation 13 
1.5. International Financial Architecture and Aid-Receiving Countries 15 
1.6. How to Achieve Policy Coherence. Institutional Problems 17 
 
2. Recommendations 21 
 
2.1. Trade Policy 21 
2.2. Recommendations Concerning Emigrant Remittances 22 
2.3. Possibilities of Action by the Spanish Administration concerning FDI 23 
2.4. Measures for the External Debt of Aid-Receiving Countries 23 
2.5. International Financial Architecture and Development 24 
2.6. International Development Cooperation Policy 25 
2.7. Respect for Policy Space 26 
2.8. Institutional Recommendations 28 
 
References 32 
 
 
                                                 
* Iliana Olivié, Senior Analyst, International Cooperation & Development, Elcano Royal Institute 
  Alicia Sorroza, Research Assistant, Elcano Royal Institute 
 
 1
 1 This working paper summarises the content of Informes Elcano nr 5, an Elcano report that is the result of 
joint work by a group of academics, civil society representatives and the business sector and members of the 
Spanish Administration. The authors of this working paper and report coordinators accept full responsibility for 
its contents. Contributors to the project do not necessarily assume responsibility, either collectively or 
individually. 
Area: International Cooperation & Development – WP 14/2006 
August 2006 
List of Acronyms 
 
AECI Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional (Spanish International 
Cooperation Agency) 
AGE Administración General del Estado (State General Administration) 
ASCM Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
CAP Common Agricultural Policy 
CCL Contingent Credit Lines 
CDI Commitment to Development Index 
CECO Centro de Estudios Comerciales (Centre for Commercial Studies) 
CESCE Compañía Española de Crédito a la Exportación 
CFF Compensatory Financing Facility 
CGD Center for Global Development 
DAC Development Assistance Committee, OECD 
DG DEV Directorate-General for Development (of the European Commission) 
DGPOLDE Dirección General de Planificación y Evaluación de Políticas para el 
Desarrollo (Spanish Directorate-General of Policy Planning and Evaluation 
for Development) 
EU European Union 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
FIEX Fondos de Inversión en el Exterior (Foreign Investment Funds) 
FONPYME Fondo de Inversión para la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa (Investment Fund 
for SMEs) 
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services 
GFCF Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
ICEX Instituto Español de Comercio Exterior (Spanish Institute for Foreign Trade)
ICO Instituto de Crédito Oficial (Spanish Official Credit Institute) 
IFA International Financial Architecture 
ILLR International Lender of Last Resort 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
MAEC Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Cooperation) 
MDGs Millennium Development Goals 
MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
NIFA New International Financial Architecture 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PRGF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
SDRM Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism 
SDRs Special Drawing Rights 
SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises 
SRF Supplemental Reserve Facility 
TRIMS Trade-Related Investment Measures 
TRIPS Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
WAIPA World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
 2
 
Area: International Cooperation & Development – WP 14/2006 
August 2006 
Introduction 
 
This paper looks at the coherence of development policies with regard to the consistency 
between, on the one hand, the objectives or results of a donor’s economic policies that 
have an impact on the countries receiving development aid, and, on the other, the 
objectives of the official international development cooperation policy. 
 
We have attempted to include all the economic policies that can have an impact on aid-
receiving countries. Therefore, reference is made to policies connected with trade flows, 
emigrant remittances, foreign direct investment (FDI) and the developing countries’ 
external debt management, as well as international financial architecture (IFA). They are 
all different kinds of policies, involving different levels of public intervention, and they are 
organised by different levels of the Administration. 
 
By going back to the classifications used in the specialised literature on the subject, this 
study covers –in a manner restricted to certain economic policies and, therefore, 
excluding other non-economic policies, such as security, defence and cultural policies– 
what the OECD (2000) has called horizontal coherence and Picciotto (2005a and b) intra-
country coherence or whole of government. In the terms put forward by Forster and 
Stokke (1999) and Stokke (2003), this covers both the policy coherence of a specific 
donor country and the coherence of all industrialised countries with effects on the South. 
This study deals with both aspects, international and domestic, as identified by Pomfret 
(2005). 
 
In other words, we exclude both the analysis of other (non-economic) foreign policies with 
an impact on the development of development-aid-receiving countries, and the coherence 
between the instruments and objectives of international development cooperation policy. 
Some of these aspects are covered in previous papers on the coherence of Spain’s 
development policies, such as Alonso and FitzGerald (2003). 
 
Very broadly speaking, the development of aid-receiving countries has been established 
as the objective we have to be consistent with. Taking into account that this study’s 
ultimate aim is to guide the Spanish Administration in its policies towards developing 
countries, we are considering development as it is defined in current international 
development cooperation law –in other words, as poverty reduction– and, more precisely, 
in the Spanish Cooperation Master Plan 2005-2008 (MAEC, 2005). The latter includes 
development as it is understood in the Millennium Declaration, which leads to the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) –the universally accepted international 
framework–. 
 
The selection of policies, international flows and, in short, the variables considered in this 
paper is explained by the unequal growth of the various economic flows since the 
beginning of the eighties, which has relegated development aid to the last place in the 
importance of economic relations between rich and poor countries. 
 
In this context, it is reasonable for a comprehensive review of the socio-economic 
development of aid-receiving countries to go hand in hand with an analysis of the impact 
of trade and financial flows (including emigrant remittances among the latter) and, 
therefore, of the policies sustaining them. 
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Besides the possible consequences for developing countries, there are different 
incentives so that donors can deal with the incoherence of existing policies. Specialised 
literature mentions different factors that can be grouped in two ways: first, the need to 
improve the efficiency of public policies in order to maintain the legitimacy of the 
governments that apply them and, secondly, new challenges raised by globalisation, 
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which has increased the interdependence between developed and developing countries.2 
As the OECD states (1996), the need for more policy coherence is partly due to the 
expansion of the interests of donor countries in the context of globalisation. 
 
An exhaustive list of all the measures required to limit incoherencies and promote 
possible synergies among the different policies is, however, beyond the scope of this work 
and would obviously need a more complete and detailed analysis of each and every tool 
the State has at its disposal. As a result, the recommendations given in the second 
section are not exhaustive and should be considered merely as a guideline. 
 
One of this study’s aims is to show the large number of variables that have an influence 
on the socio-economic development of aid recipients. Furthermore, these are variables 
that donor governments can do something about (to a greater or lesser extent). There are 
also multiple connections between these variables, so specifying the factors that 
ultimately have an influence on achieving the MDGs is extremely complex. Consequently, 
we aim to contribute to overcoming the more traditional view of international cooperation 
that this policy –and the implicit flow of aid– has had as a sealed compartment isolated 
from other policies and economic relations, which also affect economic and social 
development. Our aim is to focus on a more comprehensive and strategic view of 
development. 
 
This study also aims to offer a more complete view of the many necessary measures to 
achieve global and coherent actions from donor countries. However, it must be pointed 
out that just as the choice of measures contained in the MDGs can be arbitrary, so can 
the selection of variables and economic policies included in this document. Indeed, not 
only are we putting to one side some important dimensions of the donors’ foreign action 
(security and defence policy and foreign cultural action), but also, as we are only dealing 
with the economic dimension, we have omitted other important aspects such as the 
impact of tax havens on developing countries’ foreign financing possibilities and the 
effects of developed countries’ fishing policies on attaining the MDGs worldwide. 
 
These aspects should be considered in more detailed studies on policy coherence, 
whether geographical –country-by-country or region-by-region coherence– or sectoral –
separate studies on each economic or policy aspect–. 
 
 
1. ANALYSIS: THE IMPACT OF DONORS’ POLICIES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
AID-RECEIVING COUNTRIES3
 
In this section, and based on the study group’s prior studies, we shall attempt to 
summarise the main mechanisms by which different international economic flows (trade, 
remittances, direct investment and debt) and IFA can contribute to more development in 
aid-receiving countries. Moreover, the risks for development and poverty reduction will be 
identified for each variable and the main challenges the donor community faces will be 
summarised. 
 
1.1. Trade Policy 
 
First, as far as trade is concerned, in principle, and in line with classic international trade 
theories, production specialisation allows –and is also consolidated by– an increase in the 
                                                 
2 Ashoff (2005), Forster and Stokke (1999), GDI (2002), Hydén (1999), Picciotto (2005a and b), Stokke 
(2003), Weston and Pierre-Antoine (2003). 
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3 Unless otherwise specified, the ideas stated in this section are taken from the study group’s contributions on 
policy coherence collected in Olivié and Sorroza (2006). 
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exports of certain goods and a parallel rise in imports, capital goods for the manufacture 
of export goods and other domestic consumer goods. All this would generate an 
improvement in the allocation of resources which would ultimately have an impact on 
economic growth. 
 
Broadly speaking, as pointed out by Steinberg, the economic performance of developing 
countries in recent decades has shown that a number of features should be present for 
trade liberalisation to lead to economic growth. 
 
1.1.1. Strategic Trade Integration 
 
This is a wide-ranging and ambiguous condition, which actually refers to the need to 
retain some scope for manoeuvre, or policy space, so that every developing country can 
choose the most appropriate international trade integration policy or strategy on the basis 
of its social and economic characteristics and its historical evolution. 
 
These characteristics will therefore condition the rhythm, scope and phases of trade 
liberalisation. As highlighted by Steinberg, a trade liberalisation policy should also be seen 
(by partners, donors and multilateral organisations) as part of a more extensive economic 
development process and strategy.4 Hence, development is understood as a process of 
trial and error in which each society follows its own course towards liberalisation. 
 
Although the promotion of this policy space has to form part of bilateral and regional trade 
agreements, it essentially includes a change in the operating mechanisms of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO).5 And, despite the fact that the WTO usually presents itself as 
an example of multilateral democratic governability (in the organisation every member 
State has a vote, a system absent in other bodies such as the International Monetary 
Fund –IMF– and the World Bank), several authors have identified deficiencies in this 
respect. These could be resolved, for example, by reviewing the ‘green room’ procedure, 
which enables agreements to be closed after negotiations that do not always include 
some of the countries affected. There have also been several proposals to reformulate the 
special and differentiated treatment to enable developing countries to be exempt from 
some of the regulations included in the WTO’s regulatory framework. Some denounce the 
limited possibilities for this type of country to make use of this special treatment. A greater 
promotion of policy space would therefore involve extending this mechanism, which 
allows a certain degree of asymmetry in the speed and scope of trade liberalisation. 
 
1.1.2. Access to Developed Countries’ Markets 
 
Indeed, trade liberalisation will not generate an increase in exports from the developing 
countries if their exports cannot be sold in the main consumer markets, such as those of 
OECD member countries. Therefore, the economic development of aid-receiving 
countries through an increase in their trade relations necessarily implies the 
disappearance of barriers to the donor countries’ markets. 
 
Access to markets is mainly debated multilaterally within the WTO, whose most recent 
moves have been made in the framework of the Doha Round, also known as the 
Development Round, which started in Qatar in 2001 and will probably remain open until 
2007. With regard to the different estimates included in Steinberg’s work, the most 
                                                 
4 The importance of ownership is included in the principles of the so-called new aid architecture, as it forms 
part of the Comprehensive Development Framework promoted by the World Bank.  
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5 According to the same author, the preservation or guarantee of policy space also implies the exclusion from 
the international trade agenda of the controversial Singapore issues. This study has not included an analysis 
of their pros and cons for developed and developing countries, as they have been finally excluded, for the 
moment, besides trade facilitation, from the Doha Round negotiations. 
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conservative, which exclude the liberalisation of the services sector, predict that the profits 
for the world economy of full access to all markets, both those of rich countries and 
developing countries for all types of products, would total US$254 billion per year in 
constant 1995 dollars. Of this amount, US$108,000 million would go to the developing 
countries and the rest of the net profits to the developed countries. 
 
In recent years, although slowly, steps have been taken towards a greater liberalisation of 
the agricultural markets. However, agriculture still accounts for 66% of the protectionism 
in the trade for goods and services today. This explains, at least in part, its small impact 
on international trade, since it only represents 4% of the gross world product (World Bank, 
2006). For EU member countries, agricultural protectionism derives from the CAP 
(Common Agricultural Policy). 
 
A thorough reform of the CAP would lead to losses in certain sectors, as we will see in the 
recommendations section. Nevertheless, other collectivities should also be taken into 
account, particularly European consumers. According to the above-mentioned 
calculations, more than three quarters of the profits from liberalisation would go to the 
developed countries –more than US$50 billion year in 1995 terms–. 
 
Using the same type of estimate, the full trade liberalisation of manufactured goods would 
lead to earnings of around US$96 billion per year for the developing countries, ie, 48% of 
total profits. Although significant headway has already been made in the trade 
liberalisation of manufactured products, potential profits are still important. However, most 
earnings derive from trade liberalisation between the developing countries themselves. 
According to Steinberg, there are, therefore, no significant barriers left to remove for the 
developing countries’ manufactured goods to gain access to the developed countries’ 
markets. Nevertheless, some of the latter continue to resort to protectionist practices and 
on occasion they breach current agreements. For the developing countries, the problem is 
heightened when the developed countries resort to these practices, since they are the 
world’s main consumer markets. 
 
The liberalisation of the services sector has been a controversial and much debated issue 
in the WTO. As we know, the developed countries are the main suppliers of services, 
although the developing countries are starting to shift towards a service-sector economy. 
According to data from Stiglitz and Charlton (2005), trade liberalisation of services would 
generate profits of US$375 billion per year, in other words 75% of a full liberalisation of 
goods and services. In addition, 75% of the profits from service trade liberalisation would 
go to the developed countries. This explains the latter’s strong pressure, on the one hand, 
and the developing countries’ reluctance, on the other, to make progress in the 
multilateral liberalisation of the services trade. 
 
The WTO agreement on services (General Agreement on Trade in Services –GATS–) 
differentiates four service provision modes. Mode 4 of GATS, which refers to the 
temporary transfer of workers to supply a service, is the one that offers more potential 
advantages to aid-receiving countries. According to data gathered by Steinberg, this profit 
could amount to US$80 billion per year for all developing countries, furthermore without 
having to bear any additional cost. In addition, the liberalisation of mode 4 would further 
the flow of remittances, even if only temporarily, from the developed countries to the 
developing countries, so the impact on the latter’s welfare could, in principle, double. 
 
1.1.3. Export and Production Capacity 
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Fewer trade barriers, in themselves, do not guarantee an increase in commercial activity 
with is subsequent benefits for the development of aid-receiving countries, as shown by 
the results of several trade agreements between developed and developing countries. In 
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many of these cases, such as the Cotonou agreement between the EU and several sub-
Saharan countries, the removal of trade barriers has indeed led to an increase in trade 
relations between the two groups of countries; nevertheless, this has resulted in a 
considerably larger increase in exports from the former than in imports from the latter, 
which is explained by the very different export capacities of both groups of countries (see, 
for example, Marín, 2005). The net result has therefore been, in most cases, a 
deterioration of the trade balance of the developing countries, with the consequent effects 
on growth and socio-economic development. In other words, the production and export 
capacities of developing countries need to be fostered if the lowering of trade barriers is to 
lead to more trading activity. 
 
1.1.4. From Growth to Development 
 
Experience seems to demonstrate that trade liberalisation and an increase in foreign trade 
do enable a better allocation of resources and more economic growth. Nevertheless, for 
that growth also to lead to more development, understood as poverty reduction in its 
different aspects, according to Steinberg there have to be additional conditions. Many of 
them are concerned with the existence of a national development strategy that facilitates 
a pro-poor distribution of growth. In this case, it would involve the transfer of income to the 
losing sectors in trade liberalisation, although other circumstances are connected with 
foreign trade integration. Therefore, production diversification or technological growth 
would also be key factors for trade activity that promotes economic growth to also lead to 
higher levels of development. 
 
1.2. Emigrant Remittances 
 
The IFA, analysed in section 1.5, partly determines what Molina calls the propensity to 
remit, one of the factors explaining the volume of remittances and, therefore, their impact 
on development. 
 
Remittances have a possible countercyclical effect, which means that they increase at 
times of crisis in the destination country, although their volume and frequency are 
relatively independent of the issuing country’s cycle. Furthermore, remittances have a 
direct and positive impact on income, which leads to an increase in consumption, an 
increase in investment or both. A great deal of literature about remittances and their 
impact on development focuses on their distribution between consumption and 
investment, as this is a central element when quantifying their net impact on development. 
In principle, an increase in investment would seem to be more beneficial than more 
consumption. Nevertheless, this will also depend, on the one hand, on whether the 
investment is made in productive activities or with effects on development itself, or 
whether, in contrast, it fuels unproductive sectors whose growth is not reflected in the 
country’s standards of living. On the other hand, the effect will also be different depending 
on the type of goods consumed. If basic commodities, such as food, clothing or shoes, 
predominate, this will have a direct effect on the population’s standards of education and 
health, and even diet. This leads to a positive and direct impact on the MDGs, with 
another indirect impact deriving from the productivity of the labour factor and its 
corresponding effect on economic growth. 
 
Therefore, it can be said that remittances, besides contributing to increasing available 
household income, will have a wider-ranging impact on a country’s development if they 
are used to acquire basic commodities –or those connected with the productivity of 
human capital– and to invest in productive sectors. 
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The degree to which remittances are temporary also affects how they are used at 
destination. Indeed, according to Molina, there is a lower tendency to consume income 
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that is considered temporary than if it is permanent. If the migrants’ families think the flow 
is temporary, the propensity to invest will be greater. 
 
As with foreign trade, for remittances to turn more economic growth into effective 
development and poverty reduction, they have to be included in the government’s 
macroeconomic programme. In this respect, measures to promote the development of the 
financial markets that facilitate higher investment levels have to be established. 
 
Certain mechanisms have been identified by which remittances might not have beneficial 
effects on development or might even become counterproductive. First, remittances can 
lead to higher levels of imbalance in countries that are already suffering from an unequal 
distribution of income. This happens when migratory movements are highly concentrated 
in areas and socio-economic groups that, furthermore, are not the most vulnerable in the 
country. As it is the migrants’ families that receive the remittances, this concentration 
phenomenon becomes more intense. Secondly, some studies also alert to the risk of 
‘Dutch disease’ when the volume of remittances is very high. ‘Dutch disease’ occurs when 
high currency inflows, in this case from remittances, cause the local currency to 
appreciate, thus undermining the country’s external competitiveness –in other words, the 
country’s export capacity–, thereby reducing the possible benefits of strategic foreign 
trade integration. 
 
As this is the theoretical framework that explains the connections between emigrant 
remittances and development, we will now outline the main challenges facing the 
Administrations of both donor and developing countries. 
 
1.2.1. Uncertainty and Lack of Information 
 
One of the main problems when analysing the impact of remittances on development is 
the lack of full and reliable information on the volume, destination and use of this 
economic flow. The lack of information also limits the proposals for action that can be 
made by the Public Administration. 
 
Hence, we should start by improving data collection systems on remittances. On the one 
hand, we need to have a more precise image of the proportion of their savings that 
immigrants are sending to their countries of origin and analyse the factors that influence 
the frequency and volume of these remittances, in other words, the propensity to remit. 
This task is, to a great extent, the responsibility of the developed countries. 
 
On the other hand, it is essential to know which activities these savings are used for, once 
they are received by the migrants’ families. The most likely result is that there is no single 
pattern of remittance sending and usage. Each country, or even each province or small 
community, will probably follow a specific pattern depending on a long list of factors 
including their real possibilities of investment, their consumption requirements, the 
educational and health situation in the region, the development of the financial system, 
the exchange rate regime, etc. In other words, broadly speaking, the use at destination of 
the remittances will depend on the economic and social structure of the migrant’s country 
of origin. Case studies could throw some light on the destination of remittances and, 
therefore, the scope for manoeuvre of the donors’ governments in this specific area. 
 
1.2.2. Sending Remittances: Security and Cost 
 
For remittances to contribute to the development of the recipient countries, the first 
condition that has to be met, obviously, is that the largest possible amount should be for 
the migrants and/or their families at the least possible cost. 
 8
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As is well known, a large part of the remittances is channelled via the informal financial 
system through money transfer companies. So far, the access of migrants and their 
families to the formal financial system has been very limited due, in part, to the fact that a 
large proportion of the remittance senders are in an irregular situation in the developed 
countries. Cost and insecurity are usually pointed out as the main disadvantages to 
transferring remittances via the informal system. As far as cost is concerned, there are 
many different estimates: according to data collected by Atienza it could be between 10% 
and 20% of the amount transferred. In a study published by CECA (2002), money transfer 
costs in Spain are shown to be considerably lower than in other countries, at less than 
10% of the amount transferred. 
 
1.2.3. Use at Destination: Consumption versus Investment 
 
A donor country’s scope for manoeuvre as regards the use at destination of remittances is 
very limited, since it depends on several factors, which are, in the main, not under the 
donors’ control. 
 
First, as Atienza points out, the lack of empirical evidence available for Latin America 
shows that remittances are used more for consumption than for investment. Specifically, 
according to a study by IADB/MIF (2004), between 61% and 74% of the flows are used for 
basic commodities, which improve the standard of living through food and healthcare. In 
turn, non-basic consumption, which is more marginal, takes up between 3% and 17% of 
the remittances received. Investment, on the other hand, is absorbing only between 1% 
and 8% of the remittances. In addition, the bulk of investment is made in the housing and 
construction sector while investment in production, which would guarantee a greater 
impact on development, is irrelevant. However, if investments in housing and construction 
manage to considerably improve the basic living conditions of migrants’ families, who start 
off with very deficient living standards, then the remittances would be contributing to 
covering basic social needs, just as consuming basic commodities does. In that case, this 
would be a very direct contribution to fulfilling the MDGs and, specifically, the seventh 
goal. The latter will depend on various factors, including the welfare level the migrants’ 
families start off with. Yet again, information and its analysis have to be improved in order 
to conclude if this transfer method is growing. In any event, as mentioned above, the 
investment and consumption pattern is probably not the same for all the destination 
countries and communities of the remittances. 
 
In principle, use at destination would appear to facilitate the impact of remittances on a 
country’s socio-economic development by means of basic consumption and perhaps an 
improvement in living conditions. Nevertheless, there appears to be an insufficient 
channelling of remittances towards production investments, which would potentially have 
a greater macroeconomic impact. 
 
This problem should be tackled by analysing and identifying a donor’s scope for 
manoeuvre in the factors that determine the use at destination of the remittances and, in 
particular, its possibilities for production investment. In this respect, Atienza has identified 
a series of factors that could be summarised as: 
 
• Low bank usage, the consequence of underdevelopment of the local financial 
system and the lack of legitimacy in the sector. This not only explains why the 
investment of remittances is low, but also determines the low proportion of 
remittances that are transferred via formal channels. 
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•  A not very favourable investment climate, connected with a certain institutional 
weakness. 
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• The small size of the market, and, therefore, fewer investment possibilities. 
 
• Regular sending of remittances. They are perceived, therefore, as ordinary income 
used to cover the family’s daily expenses, and not as extraordinary and temporary 
income that can be saved or invested productively. 
 
1.3. Foreign Direct Investment and Development 
 
This type of foreign capital has been traditionally recognised as one of the most benign for 
development, above all when compared with portfolio investment, financial derivatives or 
different forms of debt. This emphasis on the advantages of FDI increased as a result of a 
series of financial crises at the end of the nineties, which affected several developing 
countries in East Asia, Russia, Brazil and Argentina. On the whole, FDI seems to 
guarantee more stability compared with other forms of investment and, therefore, fewer 
possibilities of capital flight. In general, unlike portfolio investment, it is used productively. 
However, in spite of FDI’s apparent good side compared with other financial flows and as 
occurs with commercial activity and remittances, certain conditions have to be met so that 
direct investment effectively contributes to more socio-economic development as it is 
understood in the Millennium Development Goals. 
 
1.3.1. Attraction of FDI 
 
Firstly, as García points out, so that a developing country can attract a significant volume 
of FDI, certain conditions have to be met: 
 
• Competitiveness 
Competitiveness can come from different sources, such as low labour costs –
which are usually an attractive element for intensive investments in manpower– or 
the efficiency of one or several production factors. 
 
• Existence of markets 
Sometimes there is a large consumer market as the pull factor for FDI. One 
example on the rise is the Chinese market. 
 
• Institutional features 
Attractive institutional elements for foreign investors are also important for 
attracting FDI. This is the case, for example, of legal security or a certain amount 
of trade liberalisation. 
 
Broadly speaking, it could be said that what a country needs to be capable of attracting 
direct investment is, actually, a minimum absorption capacity. This would explain the high 
concentration of direct investment in a few developing countries which furthermore are, in 
general, emerging economies. It would also indicate that a virtuous circle can be 
generated in which some minimum development levels can attract direct investment. This, 
in turn, can promote higher levels of development. It is worth highlighting that some pull 
factors will have more impact than others on the development FDI is able to encourage. 
Therefore, for instance, attracting FDI on the basis of a highly qualified workforce will 
attract investment with more possibilities of contributing to the MDGs than, for example, 
lax regulations in environmental concerns, which ultimately make it difficult to implement 
the seventh goal. 
 
1.3.2. FDI and Implementing the MDGs 
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Very briefly, it seems that FDI can contribute to implementing the MDGs in six different 
ways. As with other financial flows, these mechanisms are all subject to different 
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circumstances, which both the companies promoting the investment and the 
Administrations in the countries of origin and destination of the investment are responsible 
for. In certain instances, FDI can also end up being counterproductive to attaining the 
Millennium Development Goals, just as other financial flows can be. All these 
mechanisms are described below. 
 
First, direct investment can contribute to increasing total factor productivity, which should 
lead to more economic growth. Direct investment needs to have the following effects for 
this to happen: 
 
• Increase in competition in the destination market by means of an increase in 
efficient production or technological changes, for example. 
 
• Structural change in the country receiving the investment. 
 
• Technological spillovers by means of subcontracts with local industry, training 
actions, development and manufacture of new products for the local market or the 
creation of joint ventures. As García points out, for technological spillovers to be 
generated by any of these means, the receiving country also has to have a 
minimal absorption capacity of new technologies (remember that this absorption 
capacity is also a determining factor for attracting FDI) and/or that the attraction of 
FDI is part of a more extensive national development strategy. 
 
FDI can also lead to an increase in exports and to a more even balance of payments, thus 
also contributing to economic growth. Nevertheless, the following circumstances are 
necessary: 
 
• Investment inflows should have a bias towards exports which, even if 
accompanied by a rise in imports (capital goods, for example) and/or debt inflows 
in the country (such as financing the parent company), should not be totally offset 
by it. 
 
• Direct investment will not contribute to development if it generates an appreciation 
of the exchange rate with the consequences this has on foreign trade integration. 
 
Thirdly, direct investment can have an impact on growth by increasing gross fixed capital 
formation (GFCF), although to do so it must be greenfield investment and not be the result 
of a merger and/or take-over process. Similarly, there needs to be a crowding-in effect, 
which helps to increase the country’s economic activity, but without the local companies 
operating in the sector where the FDI is received being crowded out. 
 
These two conditions are also necessary for direct investment to generate employment in 
the country of destination. In addition, foreign investment also has to be labour intensive 
and connections with the local industry must be established, as occurs with technological 
spillovers. 
 
The effect on salaries that foreign investment might have is connected with employment. 
This will only occur if the investment meets minimum employment standards, which 
include relatively high salaries. 
 
A last means of transferring growth and development via FDI is the contribution to the 
developing country of cleaner technologies, with the condition that the receiving country 
has a minimum absorption capacity. The latter, as we have already said, is also needed to 
attract investment and for it to contribute to total factor productivity. 
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We have already seen that foreign trade integration has to have certain characteristics so 
that, besides promoting economic growth, it can lead to higher levels of social and 
economic development. Something similar can happen with FDI. The conditions needed 
for direct investment to generate development beyond growth are, to a large extent, 
connected with the receiving country’s characteristics and with the existence of a 
comprehensive development strategy, which is the responsibility of the authorities in the 
country receiving the investment. But other conditions depend on the nature of the direct 
investment. Because for FDI to be able to contribute to the Millennium Development 
Goals –in other words, for it to be capable of reducing the different aspects of poverty– 
the investment will have to make use of production factors that the poorer segments of the 
population can acquire (employment, land in some cases) and which is concentrated on 
sectors in which these same segments can participate. 
 
1.3.3. Risks of FDI 
 
As with other economic flows, the effects of the investment could be counterproductive in 
certain circumstances. Some of the ways in which FDI can be an obstacle to higher levels 
of growth and development are: 
 
• Inflows of foreign capital can cause anti-competitive situations if there is an 
excessive imbalance of capacities between foreign and national companies. This 
effect would block the possible impact of FDI on economic growth, by means of 
the increase in total factor productivity and GFCF and it could lead to a fall in 
economic activity. 
 
• The result is the same if the investment, instead of being greenfield, comes from 
mergers and take-overs, which is usual in financial liberalisation processes and in 
the privatisation of public corporations. 
 
• For the same reasons, the crowding out effect could cause an increase in 
unemployment in the country receiving the direct investment. 
 
• As García points out, there have also been cases in which massive inflows of 
direct investment have led to local currency appreciation and the deterioration of 
the current account. 
 
• In the competition to attract foreign capital, some developing countries use 
competitive advantages that end up reducing growth and/or development 
possibilities. The so-called ‘race to the bottom’ phenomena usually occur in 
employment issues –meagre salaries, sometimes subhuman employment 
conditions– or in environmental issues –which directly contravene the 
implementation of the seventh goal–. 
 
1.3.4. The Donors’ Role 
 
Briefly, the role of donors in this area is to support not only the conditions developing 
countries need to attract FDI, but also conditions that will help FDI to transform into higher 
levels of development. This means, on the one hand, guaranteeing (and not hindering) 
the production and strategic foreign financial integration of developing countries and, on 
the other, making contributions within one’s possibilities that lead to the conditions 
required to facilitate transfer mechanisms from direct investment inflows to economic and 
social development. 
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similar way to what occurs with strategic trade integration. These strategies can involve 
the country receiving the investment having a selective attitude towards direct investment 
inflows. In this way, they can include parallel protection mechanisms for certain local 
industries –by means of subsidies, for instance– on the one hand, and, on the other, 
incentives to attract investment in certain sectors that are to be strengthened by foreign 
capital inflows –using, for example, tax incentives or an improvement in infrastructures–.6
 
Therefore, maintaining this scope for manoeuvre is inconsistent with an international 
regime –or with regional and bilateral agreements– which aims to standardise regulations 
concerning direct investment towards the full liberalisation of this kind of flow. 
Furthermore, donors should perhaps even transcend the more restrictive view of 
coherence –in which measures counterproductive to the development of poor countries 
are eliminated– and take a risk with international regulation proposals that ensure a more 
direct impact of direct investment on the development of aid-receiving countries. In this 
respect, García suggests introducing provisions –within the international regulatory 
framework for direct investment– conditional on the behaviour of transnational companies. 
 
Secondly, donors can provide the conditions needed for there to be mechanisms that lead 
from direct investment to development. These actions can be established both through 
international cooperation programmes in developing countries and the support –by way of 
subsidies– of the international expansion plans to developing countries of companies that 
meet certain requirements. 
 
1.4. External Debt, Restructuring and Cancellation 
 
External debt, similarly to remittances and FDI, allows a country to offset its internal 
savings deficit and thus finance growth and development processes that may otherwise 
not be possible. For debt to lead to more growth it must be kept at sustainable levels and 
must not generate a process or state of over-borrowing. 
 
At the same time, the elements that have an impact on the level of a developing country’s 
over-borrowing are, on the one hand, connected with IFA –specifically with certain 
operating mechanisms and the behaviour of agents in the international financial markets 
(aversion to or propensity towards risk or herd behaviour, for example),– and, on the 
other, with the developing country’s financial characteristics –which include the sequence 
and rhythm of financial liberalisation, regulation and bank supervision and the 
development of the local debt market–. 
 
The main international agreements covering the coherence of economic policies for 
development emphasise that the external debt of aid-receiving countries must be 
addressed (see the Monterrey Consensus and the eighth Millennium Development Goal). 
The emphasis on solving the debt problem is justified by the effects that it might generate 
on the developing countries themselves. 
 
On the one hand, external debt is a burden that drains public and private resources from 
other sectors that are essential to the country’s development, such as education and 
health. 
 
On the other hand, if borrowing becomes excessive, the drain on resources will be even 
greater and have a more pronounced effect on development possibilities. In addition, as 
Carrera and De Diego point out, the state of over-borrowing may be a disincentive to 
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that have achieved certain economic and social welfare levels since the Second World War. This is the case 
of South Korea, Taiwan and China (Bustelo et al., 2004). 
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implementing the economic reforms necessary to activate economic growth and a 
development process. This is because the benefits derived from reform would be 
exported to the creditor countries via the payment of debt. Smaller incentives generate a 
fall in investment in the country –both domestic and foreign–, reducing the possibilities for 
economic growth and therefore also development. Similarly, the weight of the external 
debt usually limits the developing country’s access to other private capital. However, in 
addition, as occurred in several countries at the end of the nineties and the beginning of 
this decade, over-borrowing can become a financial crisis if there is a change in the 
expectations of private agents (Olivié, 2005). 
 
As far as external debt is concerned, the coherence of donors with the development 
objective should consist, first, of promoting the measures required to prevent debt flows –
owing to their volume and/or due date and denomination– leading to economic problems 
that ultimately have a negative effect on the economic situation. Secondly, donors must 
also establish or support the initiatives required to solve the external debt problem after it 
has occurred. Specifically, the following would be required: 
 
• Improving the mechanisms conducive to solving the external debt problem, which 
should include proposals for a more balanced distribution of the costs of default 
and initiatives for restructuring and cancellation. 
 
• Supporting domestic measures implemented by developing countries which 
encourage prudent foreign borrowing and the responsible use of debt. 
 
• As far as possible, establishing measures to prevent the encouragement of risky 
international financial behaviour by international investors.7 
 
With regards to support for national external borrowing control measures, a possibility for 
donors is to offer technical assistance from their central banks to the developing countries’ 
financial authorities. The financial system plays a key role in external borrowing. 
Generally, it is this sector that borrows and then channels the financing into the country.8 
As we have already seen, risks are not only inherent in the amount borrowed, but also as 
regards its term –generally short– and its currency denomination. One way of mitigating 
these risks is to establish incentives so that they can be adequately managed by the 
central banks. However, yet again, international commitments to sector distribution of 
development aid have to be taken into account when considering such a proposal. 
 
External debt management, particularly restructuring initiatives, and, above all, 
cancellation initiatives, have been debated intensely since the debt crisis erupted in Latin 
America in the eighties. As Carrera and De Diego state, the main issues to be resolved in 
the current state of multilateral debt solution mechanisms would be, on the one hand, how 
to achieve a more balanced distribution of the costs of default and, on the other, how to 
relieve the external debt burden more effectively for developing countries, whether by 
restructuring or by cancellation initiatives. Improvement in these two areas mainly affects 
the following initiatives: 
 
• Paris Club. According to Atienza, the Club’s main deficiency is the fact that 
disputes between the parties –debtors and creditors– are solved following the 
                                                 
7 Using the classification established for this paper, this set of measures is applicable to the new international 
financial architecture (NIFA), which is analysed below. 
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criteria of only one party, the creditors. In addition, its decisions cannot be 
appealed against in the courts and the debtor country has to have a current 
agreement with the IMF in order to enter into negotiations.9 Nevertheless, as 
Carrera and De Diego state, we have to take into account that the decisions taken 
in this forum only affect public debt, which is decreasing in comparison with private 
debt in the current flows to developing countries. 
 
• The HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) initiative, whose main advantage with 
regards to the Paris Club is that it groups together all the creditors (bilateral, 
multilateral and trade). Criticism of the HIPC initiative has been multiple and from 
many different areas. Steps have been taken to reduce the deficiencies in the 
programme, such as the very small number of beneficiary countries –although 
average-income countries with serious borrowing problems are still excluded from 
the initiative– or the volume of cancelled debt, particularly as a result of the G8 
meeting at Gleneagles in July 2005 –although the details of the full cancellation 
are still to be specified–. Therefore, both in these two areas and in the process’s 
conditionality or slowness, the programme still requires progress to provide a more 
effective solution to the problem of developing countries’ external debt.10 
 
• A more balanced distribution of the costs of default. Besides the need to improve 
cancellation and renegotiation mechanisms, there has to be a greater willingness 
to share out the cost of a possible default among creditors and debtors in a more 
balanced manner. This idea gave rise to the ill-fated SDRM (Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism), an IMF initiative which was rejected by the US 
Treasury. In short, as Atienza says, legal security in international debt contracts 
needs to be improved. 
 
Carrera and De Diego and Delgado insist on the advantages of multilateral mechanisms 
to solve the external debt problem compared with bilateral options, since multilateral 
solutions ensure that all the creditors will be treated similarly to a greater extent than 
bilateral ones. 
 
1.5. International Financial Architecture and Aid-Receiving Countries 
 
There is no single widely-accepted definition of the NIFA. It can be defined as a set of 
international measures aimed at reducing international financial instability and preventing 
and managing financial crises with a view to securing and increasing economic growth 
worldwide, as Bustelo maintains. But it could also encompass measures aimed at 
achieving the efficiency and stability of the international financial system, which, according 
to Fernández de Lis and Isbell, should be the NIFA’s two main priorities. In any event, 
there are mechanisms by which IFA has an influence on the development of aid-receiving 
countries and which, therefore, turn it into an element to be considered in the analysis of 
the coherence of the economic policies of developing countries with their partners. If we 
restrict ourselves to a narrower definition of IFA, its impact on development will simply be 
more indirect. 
 
                                                 
9 Criticism in this respect is usually focused on the conditionality of the aid imposed by the international 
organisation (see the recommendations section later in the document). This criticism is connected more with 
conditionality in certain areas of economic policy (which have not always turned out to be the most suitable for 
the countries affected and which, in any case, have a negative effect on policy space) than with other aspects 
of conditionality, which are considered to be clearly positive from other viewpoints, such as controlling the use 
of aid for corrupt practices or the obligation to invest it in key sectors for the welfare of large groups of the 
population. 
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Following the reasoning expounded by Bustelo, the NIFA would be relevant for this 
analysis to the extent in which it determines the volume, nature and frequency of foreign 
capital inflows and outflows in developing countries. Therefore, on the one hand, as it is a 
determining element of international financial stability, IFA also has an influence on 
international capital flows, thus acting as a push factor of financial flows for developing 
countries, which are included in this study. On the other hand, and as a consequence of 
the same international financial stability, IFA also has an impact on solving and possibly 
also sowing the seeds of –and triggering– financial crises in developing countries. In this 
respect, it affects emigrants’ money transfers, as they have a counter-cyclical component. 
IFA also has an influence, in the second instance, on developing countries’ external debt, 
as this usually increases rapidly after a financial crisis due to several factors, such as local 
currency depreciation –which makes an external debt that is generally in a foreign 
currency more expensive– or additional borrowing with multilateral organisations due to 
redemption programmes, among others. 
 
In Bustelo’s analysis of IFA, he highlights that the progress made so far –mostly since the 
end of the nineties as a result of the Asian crises– has been unequal. The main 
challenges that IFA has to face to contribute to, and not to diminish, the development of 
aid-receiving countries are as follows: 
 
• Improvement and coordination of the macroeconomic policies of the main 
developed countries. According to Bustelo, the main challenge in this area would 
be to achieve a greater coordination of the exchange rate policies of the main 
currencies and of the monetary policies of the US, the EU and Japan. An 
important obstacle that needs to be overcome in this area is the lack of synchrony 
of cycles among the G3 economies. 
 
• Improvement in the dissemination of information on developing countries’ financial 
systems and on some of the macroeconomic and financial rules and regulatory 
codes used in these countries. 
 
• With regards to the regulation and control of international capital flows, reference 
must be made to the controversial review of the Basel Agreement. On the other 
hand, Bustelo points out that there have been no studies of proposals to control 
portfolio investments and derivative products, which are potentially destabilising 
for developing economies. 
 
• Another of the great challenges facing the NIFA is an adequate supply of liquidity 
in the event of a financial crisis. The need to improve the provision of liquidity 
poses several challenges in the following areas: the creation of an institution or 
mechanism to facilitate the supply of emergency liquidity, an International Lender 
of Last Resort (ILLR);11 a cooperation agreement between central banks, such as 
the Chiang Mai initiative; the issue of SDRs (Special Drawing Rights), which would 
solve the problem of the politicisation of contributions based on loan repayment 
amounts and agreements which respect the IMF voting structure; and, lastly, the 
IMF’s lending capacity.12 
                                                 
11 According to Fernández de Lis, the term is used somewhat ambiguously. Actually, it is doubtful whether an 
ILLR, with functions similar to those of a central bank, would be strictly necessary and feasible. Understood as 
the supply of liquidity in emergency situations, it is a basic function of the IMF, which perhaps the latter does 
not have sufficient mechanisms for (Díaz, Fernández and Fernández de Lis, 2006). 
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• In order to generate a NIFA that really fosters a greater and better integration of 
developing countries in the international financial circuits, they will have to have a 
greater say in defining the architecture. 
 
1.6. How to achieve Policy Coherence. Institutional Problems 
 
This section is an analysis of the ways in which international economic flows can 
contribute to the development of aid-receiving countries and of some of the conditions 
needed for this impact to be positive. In short, what has been analysed so far is the ‘what’ 
of economic policy coherence for development. An equally relevant dimension is the ‘how’ 
of policy coherence, as without this aspect it would not be possible to offer the Spanish 
government a set of recommendations. 
 
1.6.1. Spain: The Central Role of the State 
 
As there is no international development regime, national governments are ultimately 
responsible for international (in)coherencies and national policies, which may affect 
developing countries (Stokke, 2003). Nationally, even in decentralised political systems, 
responsibility for ensuring policy coherence generally lies with central levels of the Public 
Administration. 
 
In Spain’s case, with a decentralised power system, responsibility for the definition and 
management of its international cooperation policy lies with the government, through the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MAEC). 
 
Naturally, and according to current Spanish legislation, a series of consultative and 
coordinating bodies have been created: the Development Cooperation Council, which 
brings together the Administración General del Estado (AGE –State General 
Administration–), NGOs and other social agents and experts, the Interterritorial 
Committee for Development Cooperation (AGE –Autonomous Communities and local 
entities–) and the Interministerial Committee for International Cooperation (ministers). 
 
1.6.2. Institutional Obstacles 
 
Policy coherence for development, besides being an objective, is a process in constant 
creation. That is why it is fundamental to review and adapt institutions and their operating 
frameworks to current development commitments. It is extremely difficult for States to be 
able to comply with their responsibilities in development with institutional structures that 
have not been created for that purpose and which therefore have neither the means nor 
sufficient resources. That is why emphasis is being placed on more institutional and 
transversal aspects of policy coherence (OECD, 2005). 
 
Of the different reasons for development policy incoherence that have been identified so 
far and described in previous sections, some are mainly institutional and must therefore 
be tackled from this perspective to try to eliminate them or, at least, to minimise their 
negative effects. Some of these institutional obstacles are, among others: 
 
• Deficiencies when establishing government action priorities in terms of 
development in all its spheres of responsibility, and not just in the bodies 
connected with international cooperation. 
 
• An Inappropriate policy coordination structure. 
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• Deficiencies in obtaining, processing and analysing information, by nature 
incomplete, on the effects of the different policies on third world development. 
 
• A strict and not very flexible administrative culture. 
 
1.6.3. Good Institutional Practices 
 
As far as the solutions to these challenges are concerned, there cannot be just one 
answer or just one institutional framework. The OECD, on the basis of the collection and 
analysis of different initiatives established by its members, emphasises that there is not 
just one formula to follow to overcome institutional obstacles that prevent reaching higher 
levels of coherence. However, certain lessons on the institutional innovations of donor 
countries to promote and facilitate progress in development policy coherence can be 
extracted from these experiences. 
 
Furthermore, more recently, the OECD published a report that contains a series of good 
practices in the institutional area.13 These practices, according to the organisation, cannot 
be promoted as recommendations or better practices, as they are at a very early phase of 
their implementation and their results cannot be considered definitive. However, they 
could serve as a guide after being adapted to each country’s circumstances (OECD, 
2005). 
 
• Improvement in the definition and focus of policy coherence for development. 
 
• Political leadership and support from public opinion, which are necessary to 
overcome the challenges involved in attaining policy coherence for development. 
 
• Building capacities in the policy-making process. 
 
• Building capacities that can correctly assess the results of efforts made in policy 
coherence. 
 
However, the focus promoted by the OECD has its limitations. It does not seem to 
sufficiently incorporate internal and bureaucratic reluctance towards institutional reform 
and change, above all if traditional interests in local sectors with more influence in national 
politics –such as trade or agriculture– have to become subordinate to a more general, 
abstract objective without, apparently, direct national and long-term beneficiaries, such as 
development. On the other hand, an essentially institutional and administrative 
management perspective does not adequately reflect the entire political stage involving 
different actors, who have an influence on government decisions, such as political parties 
with different ideological bases, parliament, NGOs and other decentralised governmental 
institutions that can promote or prevent more policy coherence, depending on the context 
(Ashoff, 2005). 
 
1.6.4. International Implications 
 
Among the challenges that policy coherence has to face is a complex web of 
organisations, international and regional forums that have an influence on the 
development of poor countries. Therefore, Public Administrations must ensure that the 
array of policies connected with development, divided among ministries and other 
departments, are coherent with development in the different international organisations of 
which donor countries are members. 
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Specifically, many policies that can have –and have– the most impact on the development 
of the poorest countries are implemented in the European area. At the same time, 
maintaining a(n) (in)coherent stance with the MDGs in the multiple international economic 
forums in which an OECD member country participates is a demonstration of the level of 
efficiency of a suitable institutional framework for policy coherence for development. 
 
1.6.5. Global Economic Governability for Development 
 
It is widely recognised that the development of poor countries is not feasible without an 
architecture and international economic institutions that actively promote the MDGs. The 
reform of the existing international economic institutions, created in a radically different 
context to the one we have now, is essential to achieve policy coherence for development 
(Pomfret, 2005). 
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Countries with a high income are in a crucial moment in their commitment to 
development. Adopting a view coherent with the MDGs requires a clear intention to 
promote international institutional reform which incorporates the needs and opinions of 
developing countries, without this meaning that developed countries stop having a 
predominant role. There has to be a balance between those that want to maintain a status 
quo, which has led to welfare in many sectors of the population in developed countries, 
and those that promote unfeasible reforms in the current political context. 
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2. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
2.1. Trade Policy 
 
R.1. Reform of the CAP: Compensation Fund for Developing Countries Importing Food 
and Support Programme for European Rural Area 
 
As is well known, Spanish trade policy is structured by the EU. Promoting greater access 
to the Spanish market of agricultural export products from developing countries 
necessarily involves a more ambitious reform of the CAP. This should go beyond 
eliminating export subsidies and should deal with and consolidate the commitments 
acquired to get rid of tariffs, import quotas and income aid. 
 
Although it is true that EU trade policy is the result of the opinions of each of its member 
States, for Spanish trade policy to be coherent with the objectives established in 
international development cooperation, a reform of the CAP would have to be promoted in 
European institutions. 
 
CAP reform proposals could focus on the following aspects. First, and with regard to 
export subsidies, although the EU has already undertaken to withdraw them in 2013, 
Spain could advocate bringing this date forward to its European partners. On the one 
hand, as has already been mentioned in several studies, it is one of the most distorting 
instruments for developing countries’ agricultural production and exports and, on the 
other, Spain is one of the European countries that benefit the least from this kind of 
support. Secondly, to attain more CAP coherence with the development objective of both 
the EU and Spain, a reform of income aid is necessary. This instrument, a substitute for 
production subsidies, now no longer promotes higher production levels in the European 
countryside, unlike the latter. Nevertheless, aid allocation criteria have not varied very 
much, thus preserving the instrument’s regressive component. Indeed, historical 
agricultural production (over the last three years) has been the eligibility criterion for 
granting income aid, so the funds are still concentrated on the largest farms. In addition, 
and bearing in mind that Europe’s agricultural sector –and also Spain’s– would be 
affected by an in-depth reform of the CAP, it would be a good idea to explore alternatives 
to aid that are less connected with farming, production and/or export and more focused on 
the conservation of rural areas. It is also worth remembering the diminishing impact of the 
agricultural and livestock sector on the Spanish economy as a whole. 
 
Another sector that would suffer the costs of a potential transformation of the CAP is that 
of developing countries that are net food importers, as their imports would become more 
expensive. Reform of the CAP needs to be accompanied by a compensation fund 
managed, for example, by European cooperation, in other words the Directorate-General 
for Development (DG DEV), to guard against any possible situations of food insecurity of 
certain countries receiving Spanish and/or European aid. 
 
R.2. Progress in the Reduction of Tariffs 
 
Broadly speaking, progress needs to be made in reducing tariffs in different sectors that 
particularly affect developing countries’ production and export structures, besides 
agricultural tariffs within the CAP framework. The tariff decrease schedule should also 
consider the very different export patterns of developing countries, making the 
requirements of countries with lower levels of economic and social welfare a priority. As 
would occur with a broader CAP reform, the complete removal of tariff barriers would lead 
to greater benefits for the more competitive developing countries with higher productivity 
rates. 
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Apart from eliminating peak tariffs on manufactured products, mode 4 of the GATS 
potentially offers enormous benefits for developing countries. 
 
Although migratory pressures can largely explain the opposition of developed countries to 
further progress in this respect, Spanish immigration laws already regulate the temporary 
provision of services by foreigners. In this respect, the defence of mode 4 by the Spanish 
government would be coherent with current national regulations. 
 
R.3. Respect for Rules Agreed in Multilateral Forums 
 
The manufactured goods trade from developing countries is particularly affected by abuse 
of the anti-dumping clause by developed countries. In more general terms, non-
compliance with multilateral trade liberalisation rules can sometimes be detected. A good 
example is what has happened with the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing since the 
beginning of 2005. 
 
In general, greater export possibilities for developing countries require more respect for 
multilateral rules by all the member countries –the WTO’s in this case–. 
 
Although Spain has managed to benefit in the short term from recourse to the anti-
dumping clause and other protectionist measures by the European authorities, we should 
bear in mind that, in the medium and long term, it is the credibility of multilateral 
organisations which is called into question. In this specific case, the WTO’s credibility is 
particularly relevant for developed countries, such as Spain, since it is an outstanding key 
for accessing extensive markets immersed in very dynamic development processes, such 
as China. 
 
A possible response to this problem is speeding up the proceedings in disputes within the 
WTO framework. This could be studied and proposed by the Spanish Administration’s 
representatives in the organisation. 
 
Furthermore, a greater accountability regarding the Spanish government’s position on 
foreign trade in various international forums could have a positive impact –especially in 
terms of transparency– on both Parliament and public opinion in general. 
 
2.2. Recommendations Concerning Emigrant Remittances 
 
R.4. Improvement in Money Transfer Information and Use at Destination 
 
The Spanish Administration and, specifically, the Bank of Spain can help to improve the 
information on money transfers (volume, frequency and destination). We would like to 
stress, however, that unlike other European countries issuing remittances, the information 
collected by the Bank of Spain is of high quality. For example, data are collected about 
remittances sent from money transfer companies, which means that a more precise map 
of these transfers can be constructed. The main challenges in this area have been 
summarised in a recent study by the IMF (2005). 
 
R.5. Reduction in Transfer Costs 
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With a flexible approach and by adapting banking rules to the particular characteristics of 
this flow, money transfers can be made more formal and, foreseeably, in the long term, 
cheaper. In this respect, we recommend measures to encourage competition, for which it 
is essential to improve the information available and provide more access to formal 
transfer channels to irregular immigrants, in a similar way to the measures undertaken in 
the US. 
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2.3. Possibilities for Action by the Spanish Administration Concerning FDI 
 
R.6. Provisions within Direct Investment International Regulatory Frameworks 
 
Beyond the need to reserve a policy space for developing countries within international 
regulatory frameworks, a more ambitious proposal for more policy coherence consists of 
establishing behaviour provisions for transnational companies within international 
regulatory frameworks. In fact, this type of provisions, particularly in environmental issues, 
is already incorporated into the majority of bilateral and regional investment agreements. 
 
R.7. Support for Direct Investment by Spanish Companies Subject to Development 
Criteria at Destination 
 
Support mechanisms for a company’s internationalisation will be more effective to 
encourage expansion abroad of small- and medium-sized companies than of large ones, 
and, therefore, by means of a system of incentives, so will the nature of the investments 
that are destined for developing countries. Some examples are the FIEX (Fondos de 
Inversión en el Exterior –Foreign Investment Funds–) and FONPYME (Fondo de 
Inversión para la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa –Investment Fund for SMEs–), since they 
include codes of conduct, especially environmental ones, for the companies benefiting 
from the programmes. Other support instruments are those managed by the ICO (Instituto 
de Crédito Oficial –Spanish Official Credit Institute–) and the Spanish Credit for Export 
Company, CESCE (Compañía Española de Crédito a la Exportación). 
 
Given the conditions required for FDI to start up growth and development processes at 
destination, these instruments could consider the types of investment Spanish companies 
make in order to promote subcontracting with local companies at destination, the creation 
of joint ventures with local partners, training activities, developing new products for the 
local market, promoting exports (which is not completely compensated by an import bias 
or with an impact on external borrowing), greenfield investments and, in any event, 
observance of some minimum employment and environmental standards. 
 
In addition, the Administration can help SMEs to reduce transaction costs, particularly 
those derived from information asymmetry, which are generated in internationalisation 
strategies. Indeed, unlike large companies, SMEs do not have the necessary analysis 
tools, their own analysis units or resources to acquire these analyses. As a result, 
perhaps the possibility of increasing the resources available for already existing initiatives 
should be considered as guidelines for investment. 
 
Support by the Administration has the added incentive for transnational companies of the 
fact that they benefit hugely from observance of some of the conditions necessary for FDI 
to contribute effectively to development. This especially refers to establishing connections 
with the local industry. As far as SMEs are concerned, this type of cooperation can be 
essential for entry into new markets, and, in the case of large companies, it contributes to 
improving the image or maintaining a positive image of companies that operate in 
important sectors, such as basic infrastructures (water and energy). Ultimately, the 
transnational company’s image is connected with the investment’s stability. 
 
2.4. Measures for the External Debt of Aid-Receiving Countries 
 
R.8. More Effective Relief from the Burden of External Debt via the Paris Club and the 
HIPC Initiative 
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The Spanish Administration’s main task consists of speeding up, via its participation in 
multilateral forums, the procedures required for aid-receiving countries to be able to 
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access relief for their external debt in the Paris Club and the HIPC initiative quickly and 
effectively. 
 
Specifically, the main issues to be solved are the slowness of the procedures, the small 
number of developing countries benefiting from the HIPC programme (particularly highly-
indebted average-income countries), the conditionality and discretional nature of debt 
cancellation and the insufficient volume of cancelled debt. 
 
R.9. Legal Security in International Debt Contracts 
 
Mechanisms such as the SDRM, promoted by the IMF, would allow for a more balanced 
distribution among creditors and debtors of the cost of developing countries’ defaulting on 
their external debt. In this regard, the Spanish representatives at international financial 
institutions (mainly from the Ministry of the Economy) and the Administration’s bodies with 
a certain amount of influence in these organisations (such as the Bank of Spain, whether 
directly or through the European Central Bank) could consider the possibilities of 
reactivating a proposal of this kind. It is actually a case of establishing 
omnicomprehensive mechanisms to solve the external debt problem of developing 
countries. These mechanisms must be aimed at providing a definitive solution to the debt 
problem. 
 
2.5. International Financial Architecture and Development 
 
R.10. Review of Some Rules and Codes of Good Practices (Information Dissemination 
and Analysis Mechanisms on the State of Financial Systems and Macroeconomic 
Regulation and Financial Rules in Developing Countries) 
 
Besides the need to preserve a policy space in this area as well, there are doubts about 
the usefulness of information dissemination and analysis mechanisms (Special Data 
Dissemination Standards, General Data Dissemination System) in the prevention of 
financial crises. There are also doubts about whether the rules and codes include 
sufficient anticyclical provisions. 
 
With regards to the above, a task the Spanish Administration could consider is whether 
these mechanisms, rules and codes need to be reviewed and a proposal put forward to 
the IMF and other organisations and international forums. 
 
R.11. Review of Basel II for Developing Countries 
 
Although its objective is not the channelling of financing towards aid-receiving countries, 
Basel II rules could, however, lead to a greater concentration on international financing, 
excluding an even larger part of these countries from the latter, which goes against the 
objectives set by the international community regarding development. 
 
An alternative would have to be considered to prevent this effect on available financing for 
developing countries. This alternative would try to reconcile appropriate risk management 
without encouraging procyclical behaviour in the financial markets. Spanish views on this 
matter are put forward before the Bank for International Settlements in Basel. 
 
R.12. More Efforts in Obligations to Disseminate Information by Certain International 
Financial Agents 
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Some of the private companies operating in the financial markets, such as highly-
leveraged institutions (especially hedge funds), have played an important role in triggering 
financial crises in the emerging economies. More dissemination of information could 
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contribute to preventing these crises. Despite the technical problems that this type of 
measures probably imply, the Administration may find this proposal useful. 
 
2.6. International Development Cooperation Policy 
 
2.6.1. Technical Assistance for Strategic Foreign Integration 
 
One of the deficiencies that has been repeatedly made evident in this document is the fact 
that developing countries do not have enough capacity to develop appropriate measures 
for foreign economic integration, whether in the trade or financial areas. Nevertheless, 
when suggesting different technical assistance possibilities for a more strategic foreign 
integration, the international commitments in force which affect the sectoral distribution of 
aid have to be taken into account, such as the 20/20 commitment already mentioned.14
 
R.13. Production and Trade Capacities 
 
This area includes the contributions made by the Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y 
Comercio (Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade) to the trust fund of the WTO and the 
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). 
 
R.14. Development of the Local Financial System 
 
We recommend providing greater access to banking services, which helps remittances to 
be used for production investments, and specifically encouraging bank usage by migrants’ 
families and offering them a wider variety of financial products. In this area, we also 
recommend a wider geographical presence of formal financial institutions in the 
developing countries, whether directly or indirectly via microcredit entities. 
 
R.15. Technical Assistance for External Debt Issues 
 
The purpose is to prevent situations of over-borrowing, which we have already described. 
That is why bank regulatory measures are important, established by the financial 
authorities of the country receiving the foreign capital, which encourage a suitable 
management of the volume of external borrowing and which balance their due date or 
their currency denomination. In Spain, technical assistance given to central banks in 
developing countries is coordinated by the Bank of Spain. 
 
R.16. Competitiveness of Production Factors 
 
Support, by donors, for the development of advanced competitive factors contributes to 
FDI’s pull factors. Proposals could include training programmes that promote more 
productivity from the workforce, information infrastructures and communications or 
technical assistance for the implementation of more attractive institutional characteristics 
for the FDI. 
 
R.17. General Support for FDI’s Impact Conditions on Development 
 
Similarly, technical assistance for international production integration can focus on 
meeting the conditions needed so that direct investment can have a clear impact on 
growth and development (see R.7). 
 
For technical assistance in attracting and channelling FDI for development, we should 
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14 The commitment of Spanish cooperation to the 20/20 initiative is backed by its plan for 2006 (see MAEC, 
2006). 
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take already existing multilateral and bilateral initiatives into account and consider, if 
necessary, a review of the programmes on the basis of the conditions –already outlined– 
of both attraction and consolidation of FDI development. 
 
The WAIPA (World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies), supported by the 
UNCTAD, should be assessed in this context. It holds forums and seminars in order to 
train developing countries’ FDI managers so that they can define promotional activities. 
Another example is the MIGA (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency), which also 
provides information and training. 
 
Spanish cooperation also implements this type of programme financed by the AECI 
(Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional –Spanish International Cooperation 
Agency–), CECO (Centro de Estudios Comerciales –Centre for Commercial Studies–) 
and ICEX (Instituto Español de Comercio Exterior –Spanish Institute for Foreign Trade–), 
coordinated, on occasion, with the MIGA. 
 
Other programmes that may contribute to the conditions necessary for FDI to lead to 
development are the programmes specifically aimed at the educational sector on different 
levels. The quality of the education system has a very direct influence on the receiving 
country’s competitive advantages. Besides, unlike other initiatives proposed in this paper, 
this type of programme falls within the 20/20 initiative, thus complying with the 
commitments acquired in sectoral aid distribution. 
 
R.18. Adoption of Rules and Codes of Good Banking and Financial Practices 
 
These support measures enable the better international financial integration of developing 
countries. Yet again, this type of assistance falls within the Bank of Spain’s sphere of 
action. 
 
2.6.2. Support Measures in Co-Development 
 
R.19. Specific Projects for Migrants’ Families 
 
These projects would help to increase the impact on development of the use at 
destination of emigrants’ remittances. Possible actions include training (on rights, 
obligations and benefits as clients of the banking system), the establishment of support 
systems and advisory services for production investment. 
 
R.20. Improvement in Statistics on Developing Countries 
 
Many action proposals for donors are limited by the dearth and poor quality of available 
data on developing economies. This weakness is particularly obvious with regards to the 
use at destination of the emigrants’ remittances. In this area, Spanish cooperation could 
contribute to initiatives to improve data internationally –Paris21 for instance– and also in 
the developing countries themselves. 
 
2.7. Respect for Policy Space 
 
Respect for policy space involves very varied measures in several areas of foreign 
economic action. Most of them are structured around supranational or multilateral 
organisations, so policy coherence in this area depends, above all, on the positions held 
by different bodies of the Spanish Administration. 
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R.21. More Margin for Manoeuvre for Developing Countries in the WTO 
 
The review of the WTO’s ‘green room’ system, or the extension of developing countries’ 
possibilities of access to special and differentiated treatment, would have a very positive 
result for aid-receiving countries’ development. 
 
R.22. Review of Regulations concerning Direct Investment 
 
In general terms, the fact that there is a policy space for foreign financial integration does 
not seem to be compatible in principle with national and international regulations tending 
towards the complete liberalisation of financial flows, including, as is the case, direct 
investment flows. This marks out the opinions to be defended by the Administration within 
the WTO on investment agreements: GATS, which restricts imposing access conditions, 
in other words limits to foreign property, TRIMS (Trade-Related Investment Measures), 
ASCM (Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures), which prohibits the use of 
subsidies for export and local contents, and TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights). This same principle has to guide regional and bilateral investment 
agreements, which should reflect the characteristics of the different countries. 
 
Specifically, one of the aspects in which precaution with regulatory standardisation is 
recommended is national treatment. Regulations on foreign investment should consider 
exceptions to national treatment for foreign companies in order to preserve support 
instruments for local industry so that development models can be retained. This type of 
actions, which are already being implemented nationally and in Europe, could be 
supported internationally as well. 
 
R.23. Review of Some Rules and Codes of Good Practices Concerning Macroeconomics 
and Finance Applied to Developing Countries 
 
Although considerable progress has been made in the international regulation of the 
operation of the financial system in developing countries, preserving a margin of 
manoeuvre for these countries is contrary to an excessive standardisation of some 
international rules and codes. As they have been tailored to developed financial systems, 
they sometimes do not consider the particular characteristics of financial systems in 
developing countries. 
 
R.24. More Participation of Developing Countries in the Main International Forums that 
Define IFA 
 
The redistribution of quotas and votes in the IMF on the basis of current shares of the 
world economy, giving, for example, more importance to GDP in the IMF formula, along 
the lines proposed in the Cooper report, would make it possible to increase the 
participation of developing countries in a forum to determine IFA and, therefore, also 
these countries’ access to a sufficient and stable international financing. This measure 
would also increase Spain’s current influence in the organisation. Although there are 
usually complaints about the EU’s overexposure in the institution, Spanish participation, 
however, is much less than it should be if readjusted on the basis of its current influence 
in the international economy. 
 
As far as other forums are concerned, it would be a good idea for some developing 
countries to participate in the Financial Stability Forum and G20, in order to make them 
more representative and sensitive to the former’s claims. 
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R.25. More Participation from Spain in the International Debate on the Review of the 
Conditionality of the IMF and the World Bank in its Assistance Programmes 
 
There is a quite a widespread consensus that the review of conditionality, especially in the 
IMF, has been insufficient and that it has not managed to remove doubts on the efficiency 
of economic restructuring and on its eventual interference in legitimate development 
strategies. The Spanish Administration could be more active in the debate on this 
question in different forums, including the international financial institutions themselves. 
 
2.8. Institutional Recommendations 
 
In the case of Spain, there are some institutional conditions already in place that can 
facilitate policy coherence for development, such as adding the word Cooperation to the 
name of the Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), the recent 
creation of the DGPOLDE (Dirección General de Planificación y Evaluación de Políticas 
para el Desarrollo –the Spanish Directorate-General of Policy Planning and Evaluation for 
Development–) or the report project of the Policy Coherence Group, which will be taken to 
the Comisión de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (International Cooperation 
Committee for Development) of the Congreso de los Diputados (the lower house in the 
Spanish Parliament). 
 
2.8.1. Theoretical and Empirical Backing 
 
R.26. Development and Promotion of Research in Policy Coherence 
 
We need to improve both definitions and common indicators in the analysis of the impact 
of incoherencies on developing countries in order to make some progress. This would 
make it easier to adopt measures to alleviate and counterbalance, if possible, their 
negative consequences for development. In addition, efforts should also be aimed at 
establishing measurable coherence goals, thus facilitating the donor community’s 
commitment. 
 
Although more input is required, some steps have already been taken in this area, such 
as those by the Public Administration, specifically the DGPOLDE, which manages a 
research aid programme that includes policy coherence. There are initiatives managed 
through the OECD and also projects by other private centres, such as the CGD (Centre 
for Global Development), which has implemented a Commitment to Development Index 
(CDI). 
 
R.27. Creation of Policy Coherence Networks 
 
Considering that other countries and institutions have been implementing different 
initiatives and institutional reforms concerning policy coherence, it would be a good idea 
to encourage the exchange of experiences and knowledge both at a public level (all the 
levels and sectors of the national AGE and of the autonomous and local administrations) 
and a private one (academic institutions, NGOs, etc). We also suggest involving 
developing countries’ institutions and organisations in order to increase knowledge and, 
consequently, the demands of the recipient countries for policy coherence. 
 
R.28. Promotion and Improvement of the Dissemination of the Importance of Policy 
Coherence 
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Dissemination of coherence research and experiences could be reinforced by means of 
seminars, forums and different types of activities, which can be either restricted –if they 
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are more technical– or more open to raise public awareness of the issue, such as virtual 
or physical forums. The latter can be used to take advantage of activities with a great deal 
of media impact (such as, for example, UN Summits) so as to spread awareness of them 
and have more influence on public opinion. 
 
2.8.2. Achievement of a General Consensus for Policy Coherence 
 
In view of difficulties to increase the impact and influence of development issues and for 
the entire government and public administrations to adopt them, we recommend that a 
general consensus for policy coherence is reached. 
 
R.29. Preparation of a White Paper for Policy Coherence 
 
Commitment to policy coherence for development needs to extend further than the current 
spheres of cooperation policy to the rest of the ministries and departments involved in the 
measures analysed in this report in order to achieve acceptable levels. 
 
Some members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) have opted to 
incorporate an international cooperation law, action programmes and strategies into their 
legal system. Spain, which already has Law 23/1998, could establish a consultation 
process, with participation by all levels and sectors of the public administration and all the 
actors involved, both public and private. With extensive participation, resistance to change 
and lack of understanding about this area would decrease. 
 
Similarly, some of the basic parameters to achieve policy coherence should be agreed in 
the White Paper. 
 
• Establishment of priorities. 
• Explicit allocation of areas of responsibility for cooperation and policy coherence to 
an organisation. 
• Currently, the MAEC is responsible for coordinating Spanish cooperation. 
However, it does not have the same responsibilities as other bodies in policies 
connected with aid recipients’ development. 
• Establishment of an acceptable incoherence level. 
• It is recognised that democratic political systems imply a certain degree of 
incoherence, in order to meet the needs and demands of different groups, which in 
many cases have opposing interests. For incoherencies that are considered 
inevitable, it would be best to anticipate their negative impacts and establish 
appropriate compensation mechanisms. 
• Establishment of periodic review processes. 
• Given the complexity, variety and changing nature of the multiple measures and 
policies organised by developed countries and which affect aid recipients, review 
systems and periodic reformulations need to be established for the conceptual 
framework of international cooperation and policy coherence, as well as for the 
institutions involved. 
• Clarifying specific and measurable objectives, commitments and responsibilities. 
• Each Public Administration sector and level has to know what its obligations are in 
this area so that the developing countries’ interests are one of the criteria taken 
into account in every decision taken in the public administration, which may have a 
potential impact in this area. We recommend the implementation of target 
indicators for appropriate assessment of the level of compliance with them. 
• Involving parliament more actively. 
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• Specific question time could be used for policy coherence, which would help to 
draw people’s attention to coherence and it would generate more commitment in 
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the different political forces. In this respect, the role played by the current 
Comisión de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo of the Congreso de los 
Diputados is important. 
• More transparency. 
• Although the coordination bodies of development cooperation publish minutes and 
other documents of their sessions, their dissemination should be extended. 
 
2.8.3. Creation of Capacities in the Public Administration 
 
R.30. The Organisation Responsible for Policy Coherence Must Have Appropriate 
Personnel and Resources  
 
Human resources must have the sectoral and general knowledge required to be able to 
establish and direct dialogue and cooperation with all the ministries and departments 
involved, as well as to process and analyse all the information needed to influence the 
decision-making process of other policies. 
 
Bearing in mind the relevance of the issues and policies dealt with in forums and 
international organisations, especially in Europe, it is essential to reinforce capacities and 
human and material resources for achieving policy coherence in Spanish delegations and 
representations in them. 
 
R.31. Improvement in Coordination Mechanisms 
 
As experience in other countries dictates, there are several mechanisms for improving the 
coordination of the policy formulation process with an impact on developing countries. The 
aim is to encourage those responsible for development policy to work together with other 
areas in order to resolve possible conflicts and to identify synergies that favour 
development. In some cases, this coordination takes place in cabinet meetings, in the 
president’s or prime minister’s office or in another committee or general coordination 
forum of the government. 
 
These options imply that the person responsible for development policies is represented 
at the highest level of the government’s general coordination. In Spain, this position is 
held by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. In this case, the analysis and/or 
debate of specific issues concerning policy coherence could be a routine and obligatory 
addition to the agenda of cabinet meetings with ministers responsible for other 
government portfolios and the prime minister. The latter’s active and committed role is 
fundamental. 
 
In addition, initiatives aimed specifically at achieving policy coherence can be created. 
They enable the government to strengthen their commitment to this issue and give it more 
media attention. 
 
• Conversations about coherence: regular intersectoral meetings between several 
ministers to steer trade, agricultural, debt, environmental and security and defence 
policies towards development. 
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• Focal points: some countries have created permanent units on policy coherence 
with responsibilities for coordinating several intersectoral working parties, 
analysing and managing specific incoherencies as they arise, coordinating the 
country’s views on international, community and regional organisations and 
forums. 
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• Several ad hoc or permanent committees and meetings: they are usually on 
specific matters and with varied representation depending on the issue to be dealt 
with. 
 
In Spain’s case, we recommend an exhaustive analysis of the consultation and 
coordination bodies of cooperation for development from the perspective of policy 
coherence. Based on this study, a review and consolidation of these organisations might 
be advisable in order to steer their duties specifically towards achieving policy coherence 
or even creating another body, bearing in mind other donors’ experiences. 
 
R.32. Establishing Monitoring and Assessment Mechanisms Specifically for Policy 
Coherence 
 
To do this, some type of progress index in policy coherence would have to be established 
for Spain, agreed among all the sectors and levels involved, for example in the process of 
preparing the White Paper. In addition, we also recommend incorporating the perspective 
(and other specific elements) of policy coherence in the assessment of Spanish 
cooperation programmes.15
 
2.8.4. Other Institutional Recommendations 
 
R.33. Analysis of Coherence Outside the Administration 
 
NGOs and studies on international development cooperation have a role to play in the 
formation of public opinion regarding the (in)coherencies of donors’ policies. We should 
remember that it is public opinion which is ultimately going to intensify political willingness 
to solve incoherencies. 
 
R.34. Budgeting for Policy Coherence 
 
A greater analysis of the problem by these institutions and the Administration would also 
allow (in)coherencies to be budgeted for in the long-term. Besides providing the 
organisations with responsibilities in policy coherence with the resources they need, a 
compensation fund could be set up for those incoherencies that are considered inevitable, 
in other words, to mitigate the negative effects on developing countries. 
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15 In fact, this is already being incorporated in some assessments, such as Spanish cooperation with Morocco, 
which includes the following among its objectives: the geographical and sectoral coherence of instruments 
and actions implemented in the country; the degree of relevance and alignment with the national development 
policy and its suitability with the objective of Spanish cooperation in poverty reduction; as well as coherence 
with the Spanish government’s other policies. 
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